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In the mystery Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes draws the
detective’s attention to the curious incident of the dog in the
night-time. The detective reminds him that the dog did nothing in the night-time. Holmes replies: That was the curious
incident. The incident is an important clue to the mystery’s
solution.
We draw everyone’s attention to the curious incident of
the capuchins. Beran et al. (in press) compared capuchins’
ability to make a perceptual response to middle stimuli and
an uncertainty response to difficult stimuli. Capuchins completed a Sparse-Uncertain-Dense (SUD) task in which any
trials of the monkeys’ choosing could be declined through
an uncertainty response. The uncertainty response let them
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avoid difficult trials, avoid associated error timeouts, and
greatly increase their reward efficiency. They also completed a Sparse-Middle-Dense (SMD) task in which correctly
made middle responses to middle stimuli were rewarded.
Capuchins used the middle response easily (Figure 1A) but
not the uncertainty response (Figure 1B—see also Figure 6,
Smith et al., present volume).
That the capuchins showed almost no uncertainty responding in the SUD task yet used the middle response so
perfectly in the SMD task is an important clue in developing
a psychological theory of animals’ uncertainty responding.
It points this new field toward the theoretical developments
that will make its next phase rich and scientifically productive. This is why.
You can’t explain the Middle-Uncertain dissociation by
claiming that animals emit the behavior that is associated
with the higher payoff. Then, capuchins would certainly
have responded Uncertain for difficult stimuli so as to avoid
timeouts.
You also can’t explain it by having animals respond to
minimize the average delay to reinforcement. That delay
would have been sharply reduced by adaptively responding
Uncertain on difficult trials to avoid the frequent timeouts.
You can’t explain it using some overall-reinforcement-rate
explanation. Capuchins lost thousands of seconds of timeon-task through penalty timeouts by not responding Uncer-
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tain. Indeed, their potential gain from responding Uncertain
was greater than their potential gain from responding Middle
in the final experiment in Beran et al. (in press).
In fact, you can’t explain it using any behavioral economics model. A mathematical model has no way to explain
the profound psychological difference between the Middle
and Uncertain tasks. Even if very different settings of response-strength, sensitivity, and risk-tolerance parameters
could cause the model to fit the data from the SUD and SMD
tasks, this would leave unanswered the psychological reason
why animals entered a radically different place in parameter
space in performing the two tasks. It is important to realize
that the mathematics in formal models are psychologically
empty and indeterminate.
You can’t explain the dissociation using a stimulus-response or response-strength mechanism. The response tendencies for Sparse and Dense would weaken identically going to the middle of the stimulus continuum, so that Middle
and Uncertain responses would both have the greater/winning response strength for those middle/uncertain trials.
You can’t explain it using an environment-cue interpretation. The cue environments for the two tasks were essentially identical, with exactly the same stimuli and subjective
stimulus impressions ideally occasioning the two responses.
You can’t explain it with a behavioral-cue interpretation
or a response-competition interpretation. The Sparse-Dense
conflict/competition would have been identical in the two
cases, with the third responses equivalently available as default, avoidance responses.

Figure 1. Mean percentage of sparse responses (blue dotted line), dense responses (red dashed line), and uncertainty
or middle responses (green solid line) by capuchin monkeys
(Cebus apella) in Beran et al.’s Sparse-Middle-Dense task
(A) and Sparse-Uncertain-Dense task (B). The results shown
are from Beran et al.’s Experiment 2. The similar results from
Beran et al.’s Experiment 1 were shown in Smith et al. (present volume, Figure 6). From “The Psychological Organization of ‘Uncertainty’ Responses and ‘Middle’ Responses: A
Dissociation in Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella),” by M.
J. Beran, J. D. Smith, M. V. C. Coutinho, J. J. Couchman,
and J. B. Boomer, 2009, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, in press. Copyright 2009
by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted with
permission.

You can’t explain it by claiming that animals carry from
task to task an inertial bias to move the joystick down (Crystal & Foote, present volume). That would have led to the
same data pattern across tasks, not a qualitative difference,
because the middle and uncertainty responses were made in
the identical manner. In our view, based on many collective
years working with nonhuman primates, this inertial-bias
claim carries no weight in any case. This is not what monkeys or apes do, any more than human subjects have a leftresponse bias in an experiment because they turned left into
the parking lot of the psychology building and left off the
elevator to come to your office.
Thus, the curious incident of the capuchins is constructive in forcing the field beyond its emphasis on stimuli, reinforcement, conditioning processes, and response-strength
gradients. If any of these sufficiently produced the uncertainty data pattern, capuchins would have shown it, because
there simply is no way in which the poor-person’s chimpanzee is associatively challenged, and because the SUD and
SMD tasks were essentially controls for one another.
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Then how should we explain the dissociation? Probably
capuchins used the Middle response appropriately because
it is a perceptual response to a discrete stimulus class—just
as the Sparse and Dense responses are. Probably capuchins
did not use the Uncertain response because it is not grounded
in a discrete stimulus class, because it is not like the Sparse
and Dense responses, because it is structurally a second-order response about the judged failure of the primary SparseDense discrimination. One already sees this qualitative task
difference empirically in the Middle-Uncertain dissociation.
Its explanation lies in the psychological difference between
the tasks.
Recent research with macaques reinforces the idea that the
uncertainty response plays a distinctive role in psychophysical tasks and deserves a distinctive psychological interpretation. Macaques do not need trial-by-trial reinforcement to
make adaptive uncertainty responses (Couchman et al., submitted; Smith et al., 2006) because uncertainty responses are
decisional processes that are not dependent on reinforcement
history and conditioning feedback. Macaques do not need
their uncertainty responses to bring any immediate, tangible reward (Beran et al., 2006, Smith et al., 2006) because
uncertainty—definitionally and psychologically—is not a
reactive, reward-based phenomenon. Macaques spontaneously respond Uncertain on Trial 1 of new discriminations,
but then not on Trial 2 after grasping the discrimination’s
basis (Washburn et al., 2006). This result highlights the agility and flexibility of uncertainty responses that conditioned
responses would never show. Finally, macaques respond uncertain adaptively when facing abstract memory and relational-judgment problems (Hampton, 2001; Kornell et all,
2005; Shields et al., 1997; Smith et al 1998). One sees from
this that macaques can make difficulty assessments even
about abstract and derived mental representations.
Even the species difference between capuchins and macaques reinforces the distinctive psychological interpretation
that uncertainty responses deserve. Hampton (present volume) noted that capuchins seem to be on the outside looking
in with regard to tests of animal metacognition (Basile et
al., 2009; Call & Carpenter, 2001; Hampton et al., 2004).
Despite being equal to or better than macaques at many tasks
that allow for associative, learned response patterns, they
seem unable to match the macaque in this domain. The obvious implication of these results is that uncertainty responding is not associative, or else the capuchins would show it.
This is also the implication from the dissociation shown in
Beran et al. (in press).
Thus, many lines of evidence recommend focused research to understand the distinctive psychological role of
the uncertainty response in discrimination tasks. In a sense,
this was also the recommendation of Josefowiez, Staddon,
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and Cerutti (present volume) who pointed out that the field
could worry less about what is (not) metacognition and focus instead on the processes and representations that allow
animals to respond adaptively to uncertainty in the referent
tasks.
Their suggestion is important, timely, and paradigm shifting. This approach means letting go the grip of formal mathematics. The mathematics is psychologically silent, and it
can block one from thinking psychologically about uncertain
situations. It means letting go the grip of stimulus/reinforcement, which are not applicable to recent uncertainty-monitoring findings and which do not explain task and species
dissociations. It means focusing on uncertainty monitoring
as a controlled process (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), an
executive process, perhaps a conscious process. If we find
the most illuminating psychological level of analysis, there
will be many intriguing theoretical questions to consider.
In our view, this is the pathway to the strongest theoretical
advancement in this area, even though it means that we all
will have to wrestle with our higher (cognitive) angels. We
are optimistic about continued theoretical progress in this
field, given the sharp interest in it and given the insightful
comparative scientists exploring it whose work and contributions we admire and respect.
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